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Abstract 
This article examines two concerns that accompany James Tartaglia’s claims about nihilism in 
Philosophy in a Meaningless Life. The first concern involves Tartaglia’s narrow conception of 
nihilism. His view is that nihilism is practically neutral. In response, I explore how practical 
consequences are integral to both the general understanding of the problem of nihilism and his own 
interpretation of the concept. The second concern involves a tension in Tartaglia’s distinction between 
practical consequences and the deep personal resonance of nihilism. As a reply, I explain how the 
notion of deep personal resonance could be interpreted as a practical consequence. The article 
concludes by questioning the motivation to justify the neutrality of nihilism. 
 
 
In Philosophy in a Meaningless Life, James Tartaglia claims that nihilism, or 
the idea that reality is meaningless, is a philosophical fact. To exist means nothing: 
for any living species, existence carries no fundamental or teleological value apart 
from the biological; for human beings in particular, existence holds no 
epistemological burden, moral weight or spiritual agenda. The questions ‘what is 
the meaning of life?’, ‘what am I here for?’ or ‘why do human beings exist?’ bear 
no fruit if we are looking for some sort of universally-binding, context-
transcending significance. The book suggests that our countless tries in religion 
and philosophy to respond positively, notably in terms of proposing a transcendent 
framework to accommodate the possibility of an overall meaning to life, have led 
to tricky and often unreliable paths. The simple fact that Tartaglia tries to convince 
his readers of is this: that we exist, just as easily as we could not exist. 
But denying a transcendent context of meaning does not mean forsaking the 
idea of transcendence itself. Tartaglia thinks that the importance of philosophy 
lies in being able to engage the concept of transcendence fruitfully in the face of 
nihilism. In his view, transcendence should be reconsidered as a conceptual tool 
that rightly belongs to the metaphysical concerns of philosophy, and herein lies 
the novelty of his work. The version of transcendence that Tartaglia offers is one 
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that operates without the pretension or hope of meaningfulness (unlike in the case 
of religion, and at times, science). This bold hypothesis has ramifications on both 
a philosophical dimension and a practical dimension. In terms of philosophy, 
Tartaglia impressively outlines how the transcendent hypothesis changes the 
terms of contemporary philosophical debates. A substantial part of his book aims 
at redefining our understanding of consciousness, time, and universals in view of 
the reality of nihilism. His redescription of these particular metaphysical concepts 
responds to the intellectual burden Tartaglia has set for himself in the introduction: 
to prove that ‘the question of the meaning of life, to which nihilism provides the 
answer, is the keystone of philosophy; it locks the rest of its traditional 
conceptions in place, and allows them to bear weight in an intellectual culture 
dominated by science’ (Tartaglia 2016: 7). Tartaglia’s notable conversation 
partners in recent review essays (see Bennett-Hunter 2016, Leach 2016) and in 
the special issue on ‘Nihilism and the Meaning of Life’ of The Journal of 
Philosophy of Life engage these implications in greater detail. 
His work also offers a reconsideration of our understanding of nihilism from 
a practical dimension. Tartaglia proposes that we ought to take nihilism as a 
neutral philosophical fact. He thinks that it has no moral quality and its truth 
makes no difference in the exercise of daily life and the availability of sources of 
meaning within our social context. It is this aspect of Tartaglia’s argument that I 
want to take issue with in this article. I claim that there are two concerns that 
accompany the understanding of the practical dimension of nihilism in Philosophy 
in a Meaningless Life. The first concern involves Tartaglia’s narrow conception 
of nihilism. His view is that nihilism is practically neutral. In response, I explore 
how practical consequences are integral to both the general understanding of the 
problem of nihilism and his own interpretation of the concept. The second concern 
involves a tension in Tartaglia’s distinction between practical consequences and 
the deep personal resonance of nihilism. As a reply, I explain how the notion of 
deep personal resonance could be interpreted as a practical consequence. The 
article concludes by questioning the motivation to justify the neutrality of nihilism 
on Tartaglia’s part. 
 
1. Nihilism: narrow and neutral 
 
In this section, I problematize Tartaglia’s narrow conception of nihilism – a 
nihilism that is devoid of or disconnected from practical consequences. The 
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common view in the Western tradition is that the significance of nihilism is 
directly related to the nature of its effects. Nihilism is usually understood to have 
practical consequences for human beings that are bad, though in some cases they 
are taken to be good (or a mixture of both). The idea that nihilism is bad can be 
found in the writings of Heidegger, and in the writings of contemporary figures 
such as Taylor, Dreyfus, and Kelly. These thinkers all propose ways of 
‘overcoming’ nihilism and thus of avoiding those bad consequences that come 
with the realization that life has no meaning. To achieve redemption from 
meaninglessness – one indicated by our attunement to the moods of anxiety and 
boredom – Heidegger argues that we should embark on the quest of revealing 
life’s authentic meaning (see 1927, 1936-37, 1939-46, 1954). In the face of 
nihilism, Taylor thinks that there are many rich and powerful sources of moral and 
spiritual significance in modernity. He also suggests that our culture should 
cultivate the possibility of a renewed theism in a secular age (see 1991, 1992, 
2007, 2011). Dreyfus and Kelly propose that a modern Homeric polytheism can 
ward off the threat of meaninglessness. This polytheism involves becoming 
attuned to the plural manifestations of the sacred in modernity (2011a, 2011b). In 
contrast, the likes of Nietzsche and Camus recognize the good behind the 
phenomenon of nihilism apart from the bad. The realization of life’s essential 
meaninglessness can liberate human beings from the debilitating framework of 
Western religion. It can also lead to their acceptance of life’s natural constraints 
and finitude. In place of the misguided values of the Christian tradition, Nietzsche 
thinks that the truth of nihilism encourages the creation of new and more 
worthwhile goals for human beings (see 1882, 1883, 1888a, 1888b). Meanwhile, 
Camus argues that meaninglessness paves the way for the heroic, Sisyphean 
acceptance of life’s absurdity (see 1942). For Nietzsche and Camus, the ability to 
transcend the life-negating horrors of nihilism serves as a testament to human 
potential and resilience.  
In comparison to these familiar evaluations, Tartaglia’s thinner conception and 
his morally neutral assessment of nihilism take on a wholly different tone. For 
him, the total answer to the question ‘what is the meaning of life?’ is that reality 
exists for no reason and that there is no compelling basis to make a moral 
assessment of this fact. Hence, to claim that nihilism is good or bad, whether in 
terms of its inherent nature or its practical consequences, are mistaken strategies: 
 
For nihilism does not and could not hurt anybody. The realization of 
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nihilism might cause pain, but then, any fact about the world might be 
counted as bad on that criterion; a man might react to the realization that he 
is short by becoming a military despot, for instance. Nihilism is quite unlike 
a fact such as that nuclear weapons have been invented, where it is the 
possible consequences of this fact, rather than the mere grasping of it, that 
are bad. So I do not think the possible bad consequences of realizing a fact 
provides a good criterion for capturing what we mean in saying that the fact 
itself could be bad; for on that criterion, all facts could be good or bad, even 
those of mathematics. So given that I can also see no potential in moral 
accounts other than consequentialism for classifying nihilism as a fact that 
could be bad, I think we should conclude that although the existence of life 
might be, its existence for no reason could not (Tartaglia 2016: 7). 
 
For Tartaglia, life having no meaning is a fact that one ‘grasps’ in the process of 
self-realization. It is not a kind of knowledge that is inherently bad and neither is 
it one that inevitably leads to consequences that could be judged as objectively 
bad (or good). Tartaglia is only interested in nihilism defined as a fact that has no 
bearing on a moral or existential plane. In short, he offers us a narrow conception 
of nihilism. But is nihilism recognizable if the criterion of practical consequences 
is taken out of the picture? In my view, Tartaglia’s restricted version of nihilism 
requires further questioning.  
The inherently practical significance that nihilism has in the Western Tradition 
can be seen from Karen Carr’s account of nihilism in The Banalization of 
Nihilism: Twentieth-Century Responses to Meaninglessness (1992), which 
provides a nice contrast with Tartaglia’s. According to Carr, there are many 
possible definitions of nihilism and these definitions heavily overlap. In particular, 
she suggests five elements that inform the historical concept of nihilism: (1) 
epistemological, or the denial of the possibility of knowledge; (2) alethiological, 
or the denial of the reality of truth; (3) metaphysical or ontological, or the denial 
of an (independently existing) world; ethical or moral, or the denial of moral 
values; and (5) existential, or the feeling of emptiness and pointlessness of life, 
due to existence having no meaning. While it is wise to make these distinctions 
for the purposes of argument, she also contends that they are fundamentally 
interrelated. The positions of Heidegger, Taylor, Dreyfus, Kelly, Nietzsche and 
Camus given briefly in the beginning of this section heed this sense of 
interrelation between the different elements of nihilism. In their writings, realizing 
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the truth of nihilism (of the epistemological, alethiological, metaphysical, or 
moral kind) can be disorienting and its practical consequences (of the existential 
kind) are explosive by nature. If we follow Carr’s reading, consequentialism then 
matters in nihilism since its existential element is fundamentally energized by the 
other components of nihilism. As Carr remarks: ‘It is because we believe there is 
no truth that we conclude the world is pointless; it is because we think that 
knowledge is mere illusion that we describe life as meaningless; it is because we 
see no moral fabric in the universe that we see our existence as without value. The 
despair of existential nihilism is parasitic on one of the other logically prior forms’ 
(1992: 20). In this interpretation, nihilism’s possible ontological impact 
participates in propelling urgent reflection on the part of philosophers. Its practical 
repercussions are responsible for making the fact of meaninglessness worth 
talking about. 
In response, Tartaglia may raise the distinction between the meaning of life 
and the meaning in life as he does in the book, a distinction that has been reviewed 
as amounting to ‘a very persuasive case that recent discussions have equivocated 
between these two different concepts’ (Leach 2016: 283). He may argue that these 
thinkers have been construed by their readers as speaking about the former, when 
they are really speaking about the latter. He may even suggest that these 
philosophers have irresponsibly conflated this distinction in their own writings. 
For Tartaglia, the meaning of life is a primordial issue that raises the question of 
what universally constitutes and justifies human life’s worth and purpose. Since 
it intends to make an appraisal of reality and the fundamental human condition, it 
should be treated as a properly philosophical question. Meanwhile, the issue about 
the meaning in life is about social meaning. It is essentially concerned about how 
lives can be made meaningful in their own particular, finite, and culture-bound 
way. In convenient terms, the meaning of life question is apt if we are interested 
in the truth of nihilism, and the meaning in life issue is important if we are 
interested in the experience of the phenomenon of meaninglessness. While they 
concern related issues, they are also separable. Tartaglia makes it clear that he is 
not interested in social meaning; furthermore, he thinks that the practical concern 
to ‘maximise social meaningfulness’ is an agenda that does not strike him as 
‘terribly philosophical’ (Tartaglia 2016: 4). He notes that the intellectual legacy 
of Nietzsche and Marx is to blame for sedimenting the question of social meaning 
as a legitimate concern for theorists. Their legacy is responsible for obfuscating 
the distinction between the original philosophical question about the meaning of 
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life and the more ‘recent cultural product’ of maximizing the experience of human 
meaning (Tartaglia 2016: 192, 4). For example, he characterizes All Things 
Shining, a book by Dreyfus and Kelly that is largely beholden to the concept of 
Nietzschean nihilism and Heideggerian phenomenology, as having moralistic 
intent (Tartaglia 2016: 192). Since All Things Shining suggests how one can live 
a spiritually flourishing life in the modern world, it thereby belongs to the quest 
for finding meaning in life.  
Yet interestingly, Tartaglia uses some of these thinkers as resources for 
speaking about the meaning of life. He employs their writings to develop and 
confirm his suspicion that life is fundamentally meaningless. Heidegger, 
Nietzsche, Camus and Schopenhauer are engaged in the first two chapters of his 
book in a manner that helps ground and legitimize his position about philosophy 
and nihilism. When Tartaglia talks about Heidegger’s fundamental moods of 
boredom and anxiety or about Camus’s notion of the absurd, their work is 
construed as having something integral to say about the human condition. When 
he discusses Nietzsche’s critique of authoritarianism and the crucial role of 
nihilistic despair in cultural progress and Schopenhauer’s asceticism as responses 
to striving and boredom, their claims are assessed not in terms of enhancing or 
adding to the experience of human meaning, but in terms of their relationship with 
the ‘deep, natural and ancient’ question of the meaning of life. These discussions 
reveal that Tartaglia’s narrow conception of nihilism is indebted to its broader 
notion – a notion that may not have been formulated by these philosophers without 
their attunement to the ‘universal’ practical consequences of nihilism for human 
beings. If this is indeed the case, then it would be inaccurate to treat the work of 
these theorists as pertinent only to the ‘less philosophical’ aim of maximizing 
meaning, which the dichotomy between the meaning in and of life invites readers 
to do. It is reasonable to posit that their concerns loom larger and deeper than the 
modern and pluralistic goal of ‘determining the best ways for people to make their 
own meaning’ (Tartaglia 2016: 4). It is also sensible to suppose that the conflation 
of the meaning of life question and the goal of social meaning cannot be cleanly 
separated when it comes to the writings of these modern philosophers. In short, 
while the distinction could be useful in assessing contemporary discourses, it 
would be inappropriate to apply it on Tartaglia’s own analysis (Tartaglia 2016: 
appendix).  
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2. The tension between the practical and the personal 
 
In this section, I explore how the response of deep personal resonance to 
nihilism could be construed as a practical consequence. To reiterate, Tartaglia’s 
position is that nihilism should not be assessed in terms of its practical 
repercussions. He analogizes human life and the recognition of its fundamental 
nihilism to playing a game of chess: ‘But although reflection on nihilism may 
provide the spur to practical reflection, nihilism itself is lacking in practical 
consequences. After all, even if realizing that chess is just an activity of moving 
pieces around a board may have a bearing on life outside of chess, it is of no 
relevance within chess; and so it seems that realizing the truth of nihilism should 
likewise be of no relevance within life’ (Tartaglia 2016: 42). For Tartaglia, while 
the activity may cause a player to philosophize about chess, how the game itself 
is played will remain unaffected by this reflective act. Applied to human 
existence, grasping that life has no fundamental meaning will not modify or shape 
our access and relationship to the many sources of social meaning for human 
flourishing. However, Tartaglia also says something in his reflection that is 
particularly puzzling: 
 
But nihilism is not just any old fact: it entails that everybody’s life is 
meaningless, and hence that your life is too. This must strike you as more 
significant for the way you think about the world than the vast majority of 
philosophical ideas you have come across, if not all of them; if it is not like 
that for you as it is for me, then perhaps I should start taking solipsism 
seriously. It is a thought which resonates throughout the understanding 
whenever you genuinely think about it, transfiguring everything while 
changing nothing.’ (Tartaglia 2016: 7).  
 
He also says something similar in Chapter 4, which I now quote at length: 
 
As regards lack of progress, once it is recognized that questions of 
enframement are integral to the subject-matter of philosophy – which along 
with religion is one of only two areas of culture which asks such questions 
– then philosophy-scepticism is immediately answered by the fact that the 
discipline of philosophy discovered the truth of nihilism. Thus philosophy 
answered the most important enframement question of all, the question 
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which provided its raison d’être. This discovery has produced – or at least 
has the potential to produce – a significant change in our self-
understanding, since it overthrows the presumption of a meaning of life that 
has dominated most of human history, a presumption continually reinforced 
by both our way of life within the framework, and our usual patterns of 
explanation. With the discovery of nihilism, then, human beings – who have 
always been in the unique position of knowing they will die – have learnt 
in addition that their existence serves no overall purpose. Knowledge of this 
kind lacks any particular practical consequences, but it does have the 
potential to achieve a deep personal resonance with every individual who 
reflects on it, thereby making other more impressive human discoveries 
seem like mere curiosities in comparison (Tartaglia 2016: 74-75). 
 
In these two quotations, Tartaglia denies the practical ramifications of nihilism 
but also asserts that the grasping of this truth can achieve an intimate, powerful, 
and transformative effect. This paradoxical hypothesis is worth problematizing 
since Tartaglia’s characterization of deep personal resonance communicates the 
possibility of a dramatic transfiguration of an individual’s life-orientation, which 
in my mind includes both thought and action. Will nihilism’s reflective potential 
in making ‘other more impressive human discoveries seem like mere curiosities’ 
spur the re-framing of human life? Will contemplation on the conclusion that 
‘everybody’s life is meaningless, and hence that your life is too’ cause a different 
way of thinking and behaving? In short, does the idea of a deep personal resonance 
indicate a connection to what might be understood as a practical consequence? 
We thus find a tension in Tartaglia’s text when we inquire about the link between 
these two reactions.  
The motivation for reasoning in this manner is related to the earlier discussion 
of how practical consequences are integral in conceptualizing nihilism. Nietzsche, 
Camus, Heidegger and Schopenhauer are philosophers who were attuned to 
nihilism in the way Tartaglia characterizes its impact in reflective thought. They 
were aware of its various and transformational practical consequences both to 
individuals suffering from nihilism and to the nature of modern culture at large.  
If we take nihilism as something that propels the direction and development of 
their philosophy, then their reaction to nihilism would be exemplary candidates 
for what deep personal resonance as a response might be like. Furthermore, the 
claim that the realization of meaninglessness can be held as relevant only for 
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reflection – that it can be responsible for ‘transfiguring everything while changing 
nothing’ – is not convincing when we consult its impact on the cultural history of 
the West. After all, the phenomenon of nihilism has arguably inspired a paradigm 
shift toward existentialism, religious critique, and anti-authoritarianism in 
philosophy, politics and the arts in the twentieth century, with the publication of 
works ranging from Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (1943) to the works 
of Fyodor Dostoevsky (1886, 1880) and to the political mobilization of the 
Russian nihilists. These writings and movements are ready examples of reactions 
to the meaninglessness of life that are socially metamorphic in real life.  
  
3. Conclusion 
 
By way of conclusion, I now question why the urge to reflect about the effect 
of nihilism as deep personal resonance even exists in Tartaglia’s text. Recall the 
classic formula for existential nihilism: when we give up on religion and Plato as 
paths for legitimating our metaphysical and moral hopes, then nihilism, or some 
sort of epistemological or emotional or spiritual crisis, is expected as the result. 
The loss of authority can lead to an atmosphere of uncertainty and even 
melancholy, as existentialist thinkers like Dostoyevsky, Camus, and Kierkegaard 
have imagined, or thinkers like Taylor, Dreyfus, and Kelly have hypothesized. 
However, Rorty thinks that the grand anxiety about nihilism is not an automated 
response. He suggests that ‘we can, for example, tell Zarathustra that the news 
that God is dead is not all that big a deal. We can tell Heidegger that one can be a 
perfectly good example of Dasein without even having been what he calls 
“authentic”’ (Rorty 2010: 507). Concerns about the practical consequences of 
nihilism, in short, can disappear in a world that does not care about the threat of 
meaninglessness. In this context, there would be no reason to contemplate or 
placate any metaphysical worry or anxiety. The urge to appease meaninglessness 
would simply not exist. Nihilism, in a truly secular age, would be taken for 
granted; only social meaning becomes worth talking about in an age liberated 
from these contemplative urges. Tartaglia seems to expect this level of practical 
neutrality from those who have become aware of life’s essential nihilism. 
However, Tartaglia’s approach – his lengthy and intense discussion of nihilism 
and his suggestion of deep personal resonance as a response toward 
meaninglessness – seems to contradict the position of practical neutrality that he 
endorses. 
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Tartaglia could avoid these criticisms if he did not go as far as raising claims 
about the neutrality of nihilism. Doing so would avoid the problems regarding his 
narrow and neutral conception of nihilism as well as the tension between the 
practical consequences and the deep personal resonance of nihilism. The threat of 
nihilism would be a non-issue if the metaphysical urge to explore the question of 
the meaning of life did not exist. This is as far as I wish to go by way of conclusion, 
unlike others who have suggested that his account of transcendence, universals, 
and time could stand without positing nihilism at all (See Bennett-Hunter 2016). 
After all, there is still much more to talk about nothing. 
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